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ABSTRACT:   This paper demonstrates that in a plausibly calibrated monetary model
with explicit production, exogenous money growth rules ensure real determinacy and
thus avoid sunspot fluctuations.  Although it is theoretically possible to construct
examples in which real indeterminacy does arise, these examples rely on implausible
money demand elasticities or ignore the effect of production on the model’s dynamics.
The views stated herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland or those of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.2
I.  Introduction.
It has become conventional wisdom that central banks should target interest rates
and not monetary aggregates.  There are at least two reasons for this preference.  First,
following the classic arguments of Poole (1970), the apparent evidence of exogenous
shocks to velocity leads to a preference for interest rate targeting.  Second, a more recent
line of research suggests that even in the absence of velocity shocks, money growth
targeting may be problematic because it is more prone to real indeterminacy.  For
example, Matsuyama (1990) and Woodford (1994) show that money growth targeting
can allow extrinsic uncertainty (“sunspots”) to be introduced into an otherwise
determinate real economy.
The purpose of this paper is to challenge the assertion that real indeterminacy is
likely with money growth targeting.  Although it is theoretically possible for an
exogenous money growth policy to introduce sunspot equilibria, this paper demonstrates
that in a reasonably calibrated monetary model with explicit production, money growth
rules produce real determinacy.  That is, money growth rules avoid the possibility of
sunspot equilibria.  We see the avoidance of sunspots as a necessary condition for any
good monetary policy rule.  Hence, exogenous money growth rules satisfy this minimalist
criterion.
In contrast, interest rate rules do not generally satisfy this minimalist criterion.
Interest rate rules are prone to sunspot equilibria because money growth is endogenous
under such a policy.  For example, consider the extreme case of an interest rate peg in
which the money supply is passively varied to hit an interest rate directive. The well-
known nominal indeterminacy under such a rule means that sunspot fluctuations in the3
price level naturally arise.  In environments with nominal rigidities, these nominal
fluctuations induce real fluctuations and are welfare-reducing.
1
In contrast, we show that money growth rules ensure determinacy in a general
monetary environment for all plausible calibrations.  We utilize a generic money-in-the-
utility function (MIUF) model because of its generality as it encompasses rigid cash-in-
advance (CIA) models, transactions cost models (see Feenstra (1986)), shopping time
models, and the cash-credit model pioneered by Lucas and Stokey (1983,1987).
2  These
models differ in the micro details of the trading arrangements, but since we calibrate the
models to aggregate monetary data (eg., the interest elasticity of money demand), these
micro differences are irrelevant.
We restrict the analysis to an infinitely-lived representative agent economy
because this has become the workhorse in theoretical monetary policy analysis.
3  Since
we are concerned with issues of determinacy without loss of generality we limit the
discussion to a deterministic model.  As is well known, if the deterministic dynamics are
not unique, then it is possible to construct sunspot equilibria in the model economy.
Below we will use the terms “real indeterminacy” and “sunspot equilibria”
interchangeably.
Under the assumption of an exogenous money growth rate, we consider two types
of real indeterminacy.  First we analyze the possibility of self-fulfilling hyperinflations in
                                                          
1It is possible to design more complex interest rate operating procedures that avoid these problems.  For
example, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) argue that if the central bank uses an interest rate operating
procedure, then the only way of ensuring real determinacy in a sticky price model is for the central bank to
respond aggressively to lagged inflation.  For a related analysis see Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2000).
2 For the case of the cash-credit model see footnote 7 of Lucas and Stokey (1983).
3 There is a vast literature on real indeterminacy in overlapping generations models of money.  See, for
example, Azariadis (1981).4
which the economy becomes de-monetized in the limit. We show that these can only
arise if the limiting elasticity of money demand is quite high.   This is in contrast to the
classic contribution of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983) in which hyperinflations arise for all
money demand elasticities.  The difference arises because, following Carlstrom and
Fuerst (2000), we use cash-in-advance (CIA) timing in which the money that facilitates
transactions is the money the economic agent has in advance of entering the goods
market.  In contrast, Obstfeld and Rogoff assume that money balances held at the end of
the period facilitates trading earlier in the period or what we call cash-when-I’m-done
(CWID) timing.
The remainder of the analysis focuses on the second form of real indeterminacy;
the possibility of stationary multiple equilibria.  A key innovation is that we add a
standard CRS production technology to the environment. In this case, multiple stationary
equilibria arise only with implausibly low money demand interest elasticities.  This
contrasts with the high elasticities needed for rational hyperinflations.
To understand our results in the case of stationary equilibria, it is helpful to
compare them with the work of Matsuyama (1990) and Woodford (1994).  Matsuyama
analyzes an endowment MIUF model with an exogenous money growth policy.
4  He
demonstrates that a necessary condition for stationary sunspot equilibria is that the cross-
partial of the utility function Ucm be sufficiently negative.
Woodford (1994) analyzes a Lucas-Stokey (1983,1987) cash-credit economy.
Surprisingly, Woodford’s analysis is consistent with the existence of sunspot equilibria in
                                                          
4 Another difference between the current paper and Matsuyama (1990) is that we utilize CIA timing, while
he uses CWID  timing.  This difference has a small effect on the existence of multiple stationary equilibria,
and is footnoted when appropriate.  See Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) for a complementary analysis for
interest rate rules.5
a model in which the isomorphic MIUF has a positive cross partial, Ucm > 0.  Below we
will show that this discrepancy between Matsuyama (1990) and Woodford (1994) arises
because the former uses CWID timing, while the latter uses CIA timing.  More
importantly, the paper demonstrates that these sunspot equilibria with Ucm ≥  0 arise only
with implausibly low interest elasticities. As for the sunspots when Ucm < 0, a second
contribution of the paper is to demonstrate that when a standard CRS production
technology is added to the model this possibility disappears.
The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section considers an endowment
economy, and develops conditions for indeterminacy.  Section three extends the analysis
to an environment with production and demonstrates that once we restrict the analysis to
the plausible parameter space that the sunspots of Matsuyama (1990) and Woodford
(1994) disappear, and money growth rules ensure real determinacy.  Section four
concludes.
II.  A MIUF Endowment Economy.







where ct and At/Pt denote consumption and real money balances, respectively.
  The household begins the period with Mt cash balances and Bt-1 holdings of nominal
bonds.  Before proceeding to the goods market, the household visits the financial market
where it carries out bond trading and receives a cash transfer of  ) 1 ( − t
s
t G M  from the
monetary authority where 
s
t M denotes the per capita money supply and Gt is the gross6
money growth rate.  Hence, before entering goods trading, the household has cash
balances given by
  t t t t
s
t t t B R B G M M A − + − + ≡ − − 1 1 ) 1 ( ,
  where Rt-1 denotes the gross nominal interest rate from t-1 to t.  Notice that following
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) we utilize CIA timing.  That is, the money balances that aid
in transactions are the money balances that the household has upon entering goods
market trading.  In contrast, Matsuyama (1990) utilizes end-of-period money balances,
what Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) call CWID timing.  We will comment on these
differences below.
  After engaging in goods trading, the household ends the period with cash balances
given by the intertemporal budget constraint.
  t t t t t t t t
s
t t t y P c P B R B G M M M + − − + − + = − − + 1 1 1 ) 1 ( ,
  where yt = y denotes real household endowment income.  We will endogenize production
in the next section.
  The first order conditions to the household’s problem include the following:
 
  [Um(t)+Uc(t)]/Pt = Rtβ  [Um(t+1)+Uc(t+1)]/Pt+1 (1)
 
  Um(t)/Uc(t) = (Rt-1). (2)
 7
Equation (1) is the Fisherian interest rate determination in which the nominal rate varies
with expected inflation and the real rate of interest on bonds.  Equation (2) is the model’s
money demand function.
5  Money demand elasticity η  ≡  -dlnm/dlni is given by






= η  > 0,
where i = R –1 is the net nominal rate.
Suppose that the central bank expands the money supply at a constant (gross)
growth rate of Mt+1/Mt = G > β .  Since the nominal interest rate is endogenous, one can
combine (1)-(2) to yield the following difference equation in real balances mt ≡  Mt/Pt.




  An equilibrium consists of a non-negative mt sequence that satisfies (3) and the standard
transversality condition.
  Expressing mt+1 as an implicit function of mt, mt+1 = g(mt), we note first that g is
non-negative.  Under the assumption that money demand slopes down (η  > 0), there is a
unique positive steady-state solution to (3) given by the fixed point g(mss) = mss.  One
equilibrium is of course mt = mss for all t.  The key issue is whether there are other
equilibria.  There are three possibilities.
  First, hyperdeflations in which mt explodes and goes to infinity in the limit.  These
paths are typically not equilibria as they violate the household’s transversality condition
(see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1986)).
6  
                                                          
 
5 In the case of “cash-when-I’m done” timing, the corresponding equations are Uc(t)/Pt = Rtβ Uc(t+1)/Pt+1,
and Um(t)/Uc(t) = (Rt-1)/Rt.
6 A necessary condition for ruling out these equilibria is that G > 1, ie., that money growth is positive.8
  Second, hyperinflations where mt goes to zero (see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983)).
We will discuss these in the next subsection.
  Third, and finally, stationary multiple equilibria in which for all starting values of
m, the path converges to mss in the limit.  The bulk of our analysis will revolve around
these equilibria.
 
  Self-fulfilling hyperinflations:
  Self-fulfilling hyperinflations (paths with mt converging to zero) are possible if




, that is if there exists a non-monetary steady-state.  We adopt the
mild assumption that  ) , ( sup
0
m y U c
m≥
is positive and finite.  Given this assumption both
sides of equation (3) go to zero (as m goes to zero) if and only if
  . 0 ) , ( lim
0 =
→ m y mU m m  (4)
  From the money demand relationship (2) and the assumption that  ) , ( sup
0
m y U c
m≥
is finite
and positive, (4) is equivalent to




  where i(m) denotes the inverted money demand curve.  This condition has an elasticity
interpretation: in the limit, money demand interest elasticity must exceed unity so that the
decline in real balances can occur without too large a movement in the nominal rate.
Obstfeld and Rogoff‘s (1983) analysis of hyperinflations is quite different.  In
particular, money demand interest elasticity has no role in their analysis.  The essential9
difference is that Obstfeld and Rogoff use CWID timing (utility depends on end-of-
period money, At ≡  Mt+1) so that the counterpart to (3) is




Let mt+1 = h(mt) denote this mapping. Obstfeld and Rogoff assume that Ucm = 0, and that
there exists an m ˆ > 0 such that  ) ˆ (m h  = 0.  This latter assumption arises from the
reasonable assertion that as m decreases Um eventually exceeds the constant Uc.
7  In this
case h becomes negative for small 0 < m < m ˆ , and there are hyperinflationary equilibria
if and only if h(0) = 0, or
  . 0 ) , ( lim
0 =
→ m y mU m m (6)
  If condition (6) holds, then there are a countable infinity of equilibria that have as a
penultimate point m ˆ .  Afterwards the economy jumps discontinuously to a completely
demonetized economy where m = 0.  All of these equilibria are found by backing up the
transition path from m ˆ a countable number of periods.
  Although condition (6) is mathematically the same as condition (4), the
economics are quite different.  Condition (6) does not have an elasticity interpretation.
This is because the economy has become demonetized in the previous period when mT =
m ~ and nominal rates are infinite.  After this money demand ceases to hold as both interest
rates and prices are infinite.  Why then is money held in this penultimate period (T) if
nominal rates are infinite and the price level tomorrow (T+1) is infinite?  Equivalently,
                                                          
7 If Um never exceeds the constant Uc, then h(m) is always nonnegative, and there are a continuum of
equilibria in which real balances go to zero only in the infinite limit.  Since i(m) = [Um /(Uc-Um)], these
equilibria have the property that nominal rates are typically finite even with zero real balances.  In the
hyperinflationary equilibria considered by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983), real balances “jump” to zero in
finite time, and in the penultimate period nominal rates are infinite.10
why are money balances held at the end of this penultimate period even though they can
never be used for transactions?  Because under the peculiar assumption of CWID timing
households receive utility from end-of-period money, that is, transactions in time-t are
facilitated with the nominal money balances the household has at the beginning of time
t+1. Condition (6) is thus a restriction devoid of economic content.  The usual argument
that hyperinflationary paths are always possible in infinite horizon monetary models
results from a very peculiar timing assumption.  In contrast, in the case of CIA timing a
continuum of hyperinflationary paths are possible if and only if the limiting interest
elasticity is quite large, in excess of unity.
8
 
  Multiple Stationary Equilibria:
  Our primary focus for the remainder of the paper is on the third equilibrium
possibility: multiple stationary equilibria.  We find these more compelling than the
hyperinflationary equilibria because, as noted by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983), even if the
interest rate elasticity of money demand exceeds unity, these hyperinflations can still be
ruled out under the mild assumption that the government guarantees a minimal real
redemption value for money.  In contrast, the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria is
much more troubling.  Since all of these paths converge to the monetary steady-state,
simple limiting arguments cannot rule them out.
  Returning to condition (3) and the implicit g-mapping, it is straightforward to
calculate the slope of g at mss:
                                                          
8 Typical estimates of money demand elasticity are far below unity.   However, in the case of
hyperinflations the evidence is less clear.  Cagan (1956) estimates a semi-elasticity of about 4.5, implying
an elasticity of 4.5 times the nominal rate.  During the high inflation periods this elasticity will exceed
unity.11
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where η  = -dlnm/dlni > 0 is the interest elasticity of money demand.  Recall that






= η .   (8)
For what follows, it is helpful to note that the values of η  and Ucm are logically distinct.
Although economic theory and empirical evidence implies that η  is positive, Feenstra
(1986) demonstrates that there is no theoretical restriction on the sign of Ucm.
9  For any
given value of Ucm, there exists a value of Umm < 0 that maps into any estimated η .
Holding Ucm fixed, η  varies inversely with the absolute value of Umm.
  A necessary and sufficient condition for local real indeterminacy is that g′ (mss) is
within the unit circle.  The expression for g′ (mss) thus implies that there exist stationary
sunspot equilibria in this endowment model only if (1+mUcm/Uc ) < 0 or if η  is
sufficiently small.
  What is the intuition for these multiple stationary equilibria?  Suppose that real
balances begin below steady state, mt < mss.  Since the path is stationary, it must be the
case that mt < mt+1, ie., the path is moving back to the steady-state.  For mt < mss, it must
be the case that the nominal rate at time-t is above steady-state.  But given a constant
money growth rule it also must be the case that inflation is below steady-state.  Therefore
the real rate of interest must be sufficiently above steady-state.  Hence, stationary sunspot
                                                          
9 For example, using  Feenstra’s (1986) transactions cost model, c denotes total consumption expenditures,
including transactions costs.  These expenditures are turned into actual consumption (ac) with the
assistance of real cash balances, ac = φ (c,m).  Utility is thus given by U(ac) = U(φ (c,m)).  Since U is
concave, assuming that the cross partial of φ  is positive does not guarantee that the cross partial of U is
positive.12
equilibria are possible only if lower real balances (mt < mss) lead to increases in the real
rate of interest.  From (1), the effect of real balances on the real rate of interest depends
upon the sign of (Umm + Ucm ).  If this term is sufficiently negative, then there are sunspot
equilibria.
  There are thus two cases, one corresponding to Ucm being sufficiently negative
and the other to Umm being sufficiently negative.  First, if Ucm is sufficiently negative so
that (1+mUcm/Uc ) < 0, then we have non-oscillatory sunspot equilibria (0 < g′ (mss) < 1)
for all values of η .  These are akin to those discussed in Matsuyama (1990).
10
  Second, even if (1+mUcm/Uc ) >0, there are sunspot equilibria if Umm is
sufficiently negative.  Recalling that η  varies inversely with Umm, this corresponds to an
η  that is sufficiently small. These equilibria are oscillatory because with an extremely
small money demand elasticity a given movement in real balances requires an extremely
large movement in the nominal rate and hence the real rate.  Such a large real rate
movement requires real balances between t and t+1 to be sufficiently different (mt< mss <
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η ,( 9 )
  then -1 < g′ (mss) < 0 and we have oscillatory sunspot equilibria.  As η  increases and
g′ (mss) falls below -1, the Hopf-Bifurcation theorem implies that the two-period cycles
associated with an Eigenvalue of –1 eventually increase until the cycles become infinite,
                                                          


















.  Matsuyama thus concludes that (1+mUcm/Uc) < 0 is necessary for
real indeterminacy but not sufficient.  In the case of CIA timing, this negativity condition is sufficient, but13
that is chaotic dynamics emerge.
11  In these cases sunspot equilibria are also possible
although the economy is not locally stable.  If η  becomes large enough this possibility























so that g′ (mss) > 1.  For the remainder of the paper our focus will be on local analysis, but
the reader may note that there is a small range between conditions (9) and (10) in which
the local determinacy conditions are not sufficient for global determinacy.
In summary, there exist stationary sunspot equilibria if and only if (i) Ucm is
sufficiently negative, or (ii) Umm is sufficiently negative.   In the next section we will
demonstrate that the former equilibria disappear in a model with explicit production as
the optimization conditions for production constrain the behavior of Uc.  As for the latter,
these equilibria arise only under implausibly low interest elasticities.  The following
example will provide a precise bound.














Am c U .
In this case there is a unit consumption elasticity, and η  = 1/ρ  is the interest elasticity.
The sign of Ucm is given by the sign of ρ -σ .   As ρ  goes to infinity the utility function
                                                                                                                                                                            
not necessary.
11 See Fukuda (1993), Matsuyama (1991), and Michener and Ravikumar (1998).14






















where v = c/m denotes steady-state velocity.  Henceforth we will typically assume v > 1.
(However, as ρ  goes to infinity, v will converge to one.)  There are two cases:
(1) If  0 ) 1 ( < − + + σ ρ i v , then  1 ) ( ' 0 < < ss m g , and we have non-oscillatory sunspot
equilibria.  Since velocity is large relative to the nominal rate, we need σ  quite large
for these sunspots to arise, ie., Ucm must be sufficiently negative.
(2)  If  0 ) 1 ( > − + + σ ρ i v , then we can have oscillatory sunspot equilibria
( 0 ) ( ' 1 < < − ss m g ) if and only if v-1-R > 0 and if ρ  is sufficiently large (η  is
sufficiently small):
[]






) 1 ( 2 σ
ρ .
This region is quite small.  For σ  =10, v = 3, R = 1.02, this region is ρ > 293 , or η  < .003.
This is an implausibly low interest elasticity.  A sufficient condition for global
determinacy (and hence to rule out chaotic equilibria) is  ρ < 147 , or η  > .006 (see (10)
vs. (9)).  Notice that for a rigid cash-in-advance constraint, ρ  goes to infinity, but v goes
to one, so that the requirement v > 1+R is not satisfied, and there is determinacy.
Similarly, as we shrink the time period between visits to the bank, then v declines until
the condition v > 1+R is not satisfied so that the oscillatory sunspots disappear.
III.  A Production Economy.15
  In this section we will add a standard production technology to the analysis. Assume
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  and that production takes the standard Cobb-Douglas form:
 
α α − =
1 L K y  with a constant depreciation rate of δ.
  We will consider more general preferences over labor below.
  The additional Euler equations for labor choice (12) and capital accumulation (13)
are familiar:
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  Real money balances indirectly enter both of these marginal conditions via the cross
partials (Ucm) of the utility function. As a result the behavior of real balances typically
alters the economy’s behavior relative to an otherwise standard real business cycle (RBC)
model.
For present purposes, a critical issue is that (12)-(13) place restrictions on the
behavior of Uc.  This is particularly clear in the case of linear leisure (γ=0).  Let xt =
(Lt/Kt) denote the labor-capital ratio.  Exploiting the linearity in leisure preferences, we




α δ − β + αβ = 1 1 ) 1 ( t t t x x x .16
Since (12) implies that Uc depends only on x, then real balances, m, depend only on c and
x so that we can rewrite (14) as
) , ( ) 1 (
1
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1 t t t m x q m = +
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3
1 t t t t K m x q K = + .
It is immediately obvious that we have a block-recursive system, with eigenvalues given
by the diagonal elements.  For determinacy we need two explosive roots.  The first and
third eigenvalues are given by
1















so that we have determinacy if and only if 
2
m q  is outside the unit circle. Equivalently, we
need to evaluate the slope of the g-function given by (3), holding xt, that is Uc(t),
constant.  This restriction imposes a relationship between c and m, c = c(m),  with dc/dm


















Concavity implies [ ]
2
mc cc mm U U U − > 0 and  cc U < 0.  Hence, the only possible equilibria are
oscillatory.  The non-oscillatory equilibria have disappeared because the implicit conditions on Uc
make it impossible for (1+mUcm/Uc ) < 0.
12  This suggests that we have sunspots only if η  is
sufficiently small.  This is the case, as an example will demonstrate:
 
An Example: Suppose preferences are given by
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Notice that the only type of real indeterminacy possible is of the oscillatory type.
As a special case let ρ  go to infinity, that is, η  goes to zero so that the utility






) ( ss m g  so that the model is indeterminate if and only if σ  > 2.  This is
exactly the result derived by Farmer (1999) in his text and extended by Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1999) to a model with capital.   The result is also implicit in Woodford (1994) in
the Lucas-Stokey model. These results suggested that money growth rules were likely
                                                          
12 In the case of CWID  timing we have
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which always exceeds one so that we never have real indeterminacy.18
prone to sunspots.  But this result does not hold up under more reasonable calibrations of
money demand elasticity.
In general we have local indeterminacy if and only if σ (i+v) > 2R and if ρ  is
sufficiently large:









Notice that as in the case of a strict CIA constraint indeterminacy becomes more likely
the larger is σ.   Accordingly we choose σ  =10 the upper end of plausible estimates to
demonstrate the implausibility of sunspots.  Calibrating to quarterly data we choose
R=1.02 (8% annualized).  Given these choices the larger is v the easier it is to get
sunspots.  Therefore we interpret money to mean the monetary base so that quarterly
velocity is 3.  Given these choices the indeterminacy region is ρ > 108 , so that there are
sunspots only if η  < .009!  This is an implausibly low money demand elasticity.
13  As
before a sufficient condition for global determinacy is ρ < 54  or η  > .018.
Notice that we calibrated according to quarterly data.  Most would contend that if
money is being held to facilitate transactions that the model should be calibrated to an
even higher frequency. Calibrating to a higher frequency, however, makes indeterminacy
even less likely since v and i decline so that the condition σ (i+v) > 2R no longer is
satisfied.
Moving away from linear leisure (γ > 0) has no quantitative effect on our results.
Remarkably, even with an extremely small labor supply elasticity (eg.,  γ = 100) the
cutoff for local indeterminacy is unchanged to the first decimal point. We conclude that19
for all reasonable calibrations there is real determinacy under an exogenous money
growth process.
IV.  Conclusion.
One of the first papers to integrate money into a real business cycle model is
Cooley and Hansen (1989).  That paper assumed log preferences over consumption,
linear preferences over leisure, imposed a strict cash-in-advance constraint, and assumed
an exogenous money growth rate.  The model as written is determinate.  However, if the
risk aversion coefficient is greater than 2 (an entirely reasonable assumption), then the
real economy is indeterminate.  This has led Woodford (1994) and others to argue for the
inherent instability of money growth rules.
A surprising contribution of this paper is that even though estimated money
demand elasticities are fairly small, the absolute zero elasticity inherent in the cash-in-
advance constraint is critical for the existence of stationary sunspots in the Cooley-
Hansen model.  For all plausible money demand elasticities and risk aversion coefficients
within the reasonable range, the Cooley-Hansen model is determinate.
For self-fulfilling hyperinflationary equilibria to be rational, however, we show
that the interest elasticity of money demand must be quite large –exceeding unity.  This
contrasts with the results of Obstfeld and Rogoff who use CWID timing.
The paper’s analysis was conducted within the context of a generic aggregative
MIUF model, an environment that is incredibly general, encompassing transactions cost
models, shopping time models, rigid cash-in-advance models, and cash-credit models.
                                                                                                                                                                            
13 This is low even for short-run elasticities.  The relevant elasticity for stability analysis, however, is the20
Hence, it is hard to imagine a plausibly calibrated monetary environment in which money
growth rules are prone to stationary sunspots.  In contrast, stationary sunspots are
endemic under most interest rate operating procedures.  This result provides some
theoretical support for those who favor money growth targeting.
                                                                                                                                                                            
long-run elasticity which is substantially greater.21
References
Azariadis, Costas, “Self-fulfilling prophecies,” Journal of Economic Theory (25),
1981, 380-396.
Benhabib, Jess, Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe, and Martin Uribe, “Monetary Policy
and Multiple Equlibria,” 2000 working paper.
Cagan, Phillip, “The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation,” in M. Friedman
(ed.), Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, 1956: University of Chicago Press.
Carlstrom, Charles T, and Timothy S. Fuerst, “Timing and Real Indeterminacy in
Monetary Models,” March 2000, forthcoming, Journal of Monetary Economics.
Carlstrom, Charles T, and Timothy S. Fuerst, “Forward vs. Backward Looking
Taylor Rules,” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland working paper, 2000.
Carlstrom, Charles T, and Timothy S. Fuerst, “Real Indeterminacy in Monetary
Models with Nominal Interest Rate Distortions,” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
working paper, 1999.
Cooley, Thomas F., and Gary D. Hansen, “The Inflation Tax in a Real Business
Cycle Model,” American Economic Review 79(4), September 1989, 733-748.
Farmer, Roger E.A., Macroeconomics of Self-Fulfilling Prophecies, 1999: MIT
Press.
Fukuda, Shin-ichi, “The emergence of equilibrium cycles in a monetary economy
with a separable utility funciton,” Journal of Monetary Economics 32(2), November
1993, 321-334.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr., and Nancy L. Stokey, “Optimal fiscal and monetary policy
in an economy without capital,” Journal of Monetary Economics 12(1), July 1983, 55-94.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr., and Nancy L. Stokey, “Money and Interest in a Cash-in-
Advance Economy,” Econometrica 55(3), May 1987, 491-514.
Matsuyama, Kiminori, “Sunspot equilibria (rational bubbles) in a model of
Money-in-the-utility function,” Journal of Monetary Economics 25 (1), January 1990,
137-144.
Matsuyama, Kiminori, “Endogenous Price Fluctuations in an Optimizing Model
of a Monetary Economy,” Econometrica 59(6), November 1991, 1617-1631.
Michener, Ronald, and B. Ravikumar, “Chaotic dynamics in a cash-in-advance
economy,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 22, 1998, 1117-1137.22
Obstfeld, M. and K. Rogoff ,  “Speculative Hyperinflations in Maximizing
Models:  Can we Rule them out?” Journal of Political Economy 91, 1983, 675-687.
Obstfeld, M. and K. Rogoff ,  “Ruling out Divergent Speculative Bubbles,”
Journal of Monetary Economics (17), 1986, 349-362.
Woodford, M., “Monetary Policy and Price Level Determinacy in a Cash-in-




F Fe ed de er ra al l   R Re es se er rv ve e   B Ba an nk k   
o of f   C Cl le ev ve el la an nd d
R Re es se ea ar rc ch h   D De ep pa ar rt tm me en nt t
P P. .O O. .   B Bo ox x   6 63 38 87 7
C Cl le ev ve el la an nd d, ,   O OH H   4 44 41 10 01 1
Address Correction Requested:
Please send corrected mailing label to the
Federal  Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 
Research Department, 
P .O. Box 6387, 
Cleveland, OH 44101